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15 October 1965

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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C O N T E N T S

[REDACTED]

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2. India-Pakistan: Current situation report. (Page 3)
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5. Nigeria: Political crisis in Western Region may place serious strains on national unity. (Page 8)


[REDACTED]

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7. Notes: [REDACTED]

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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\*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: Three Vietnamese army battalions on 13-14 October engaged an unknown number of Viet Cong troops in fairly heavy fighting for more than 24 hours during the initial phase of a sweep operation southwest of Can Tho, the capital of Phong Dinh Province. With air and artillery support, government forces as of 14 October had killed 61 Viet Cong and captured six. An additional 105 Viet Cong are believed to have been killed. Government losses stand at 53 killed (1 US), 53 wounded (3 US), and three missing. The operation has been terminated.

Elsewhere, government units in Quang Ngai and Quang Duc provinces on 12-13 October suffered relatively light casualties while killing 47 Viet Cong and capturing five others.

According to initial reports, government troops conducting a follow-up of the US B-52 Stratofortress bombing mission in Binh Duong Province on 13 October found no evidence of Viet Cong casualties or damage to enemy facilities.

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\*India-Pakistan: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

Relative quiet continues to prevail along the cease-fire line in Kashmir and the Punjab, while diplomatic efforts to separate the opposing forces continue.

UN Secretary General Thant is sending messages to Ayub and Shastri calling on them to implement promptly that part of the UN resolution dealing with the withdrawal of forces, according to Under Secretary Bunche. Thant wants the two sides either to submit individual plans for withdrawal or to allow the UN to draw up a combined plan.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto has assured Ambassador Goldberg in New York that Pakistan is willing to withdraw its forces to positions occupied on 5 August. It is not clear, however, whether Pakistan's willingness to pull back also applies to the Pakistani-sponsored infiltrators behind the lines in Indian-held Kashmir. Rawalpindi has heretofore disclaimed responsibility for the infiltrators, while India has strongly and persistently demanded their removal.

[Bhutto, while speaking with Ambassador Goldberg, again raised the possibility of Pakistani acceptance of the Soviet offer of "good offices" to help resolve the Kashmir dispute by arranging a meeting between Ayub and Shastri at Tashkent. The Pakistanis probably hope that frequent reminders of a potentially significant Soviet role will induce the US and UK to be more forthcoming in their support of Pakistan's position on Kashmir.]

[Bhutto has asked for the dismissal of General Nimmo, chief of the UN observer group in Kashmir, whom Pakistan considers to be too pro-Indian.]

[The status and control of the UN observer groups in Kashmir and the Punjab has become a live issue between India and Pakistan. India refuses to recognize

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the new Punjab group as a separate entity, while Pakistan resists any organic link between the two groups. These positions run parallel to New Delhi's insistence that Kashmir is an integral part of India and Rawalpindi's claim that the state remains disputed territory.]

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25X1 [redacted] India would not bow to Western economic pressure and suggested that a cooling off period is necessary before any negotiations on Pakistan-India problems could begin.]


Further strains could develop in Indo-Pakistani relations if New Delhi follows through with a reported proposal to refuse to pay a \$16 million installment due to Pakistan under the Indus River Treaty. The Indus River agreement, which provides for joint development of water resources in the Punjab, represents one of the rare efforts by the two countries to work jointly for their mutual benefit. An Indian default could add a bitter squabble over water rights to an already extensive list of contentious issues.

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15 Oct 65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map



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\*Indonesia: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

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Essentially there are now two governments in Indonesia--one headed by Sukarno and the other by the top army leadership. Although these two factions are competing for power, for the moment they need each other, and both fear civil war if they go into open opposition.

Sukarno's name and his unifying influence are important to the army in consolidating its position and particularly in controlling the political situation in Central Java where the Communists have accumulated strength. Sukarno, for his part, appears reluctant to discard the army until he can rebuild the Communist Party into a strong and acceptable base of support.

The army has scored a definite advance with Sukarno's announcement that he has appointed Major General Suharto as Commander of the Army. At the same time Sukarno has terminated General Pranoto's assignment as "daily administrative head" of the army thus ending the divided army leadership he had established after the death of General Yani, the former army commander. Suharto led the army's counter move against the 30 September coup attempt and was the army's choice to succeed Yani.

It is unlike Sukarno to make such a concession to the army without demanding a quid pro quo. No information is yet available as to what the army may have conceded. However, Radio Djakarta announced last night that the army has called a temporary halt to its operations

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against those involved in the attempted coup "in the interests of maintaining peace and facilitating investigations into the coup."

During the past 24 hours, however, the army and other anti-Communist groups have continued to act against the PKI.

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
Christian and Moslem youth groups continued their demonstrations against the PKI and other Communist front organizations on 14 October. The US Embassy comments that the demonstrators are rapidly running out of targets. The army yesterday placed a heavy guard around the Chinese Communist Embassy, which had been rumored as a possible target.

The Anti-Foreign Bases Conference, scheduled to open in Djakarta on 16 October, offers Sukarno a podium from which to make his first major appearance since the coup. The US Embassy suspects that he plans to use the occasion for an important address possibly related to the internal situation.

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South Africa: [South African jet fighters have recently been seen at a new airfield in the Caprivi Strip of South West Africa.]

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[Last June, when its construction became known, the Verwoerd government announced that it was an emergency landing field for the South African Airways international flights.]

[The mandate under which South Africa holds South West Africa forbids the construction of military bases and the stationing of troops in the territory and, to date, South Africa has avoided violating these restrictions. Military use of the Caprivi airfield, if generally known, would provoke an outcry from other African states, and might adversely affect the forthcoming judgment by the International Court of Justice on South Africa's administration of the mandate.]

[It is likely that the sighted aircraft were on a training exercise, but their presence there could also reflect concern about political developments in Rhodesia.]

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Nigeria: A political crisis in the Nigerian federation's Western Region may place serious strains on national unity.

The crisis results from the regional government's apparent rigging of the region's parliamentary elections on 11 October to ensure a landslide victory. The opposition alliance has refused to accept the announced results and is proclaiming itself victorious.

The election aftermath--which has included the arrest of the West's opposition leader--has been marked by considerable violence, but thus far the large contingents of federal police and army have generally been able to maintain order.

Continued refusal by the opposition alliance to accept the results could have national repercussions. Members of the alliance control the governments of two other regions and have representatives in the federal government of Prime Minister Balewa, which is dominated by the Conservative party of Balewa's populous Northern Region.

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NOTES

Uganda: [Recent incidents culminating in the arrest of seven army officers are likely to exacerbate tensions within Prime Minister Obote's cabinet. The officers, including a brother of Minister of State Ibiringa, were jailed after they assumed control of army headquarters and the main ammunition depot on 9 October, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Obote's radical confidants are likely to exaggerate the role of Ibiringa, who is known to be favorable to the US. 7 [REDACTED]

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Syria: [Continuing personal and sectarian rivalries within the Baathist military regime in Damascus could lead to another reshuffle in the Syrian power structure soon. Rumors of impending command changes have increased since the return to Damascus last week of former deputy premier Umran after ten months in Spain. While President Hafiz' talent for compromise has enabled him to survive regime infighting for more than two years, shifting loyalties within the army now have made his position uncertain. 7 [REDACTED]

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USSR-Warsaw Pact: Moscow is continuing deliberately to provide the West with detailed and apparently accurate information on the quadripartite Warsaw Pact exercise about to begin in East Germany. At a military reception in Moscow on 12 October, a Soviet colonel sought out the US Army attaché and expanded considerably on exercise information provided a week earlier by pact commander Marshal Grechko. Moscow's unusual disclosure of information on this exercise is probably designed both to impress the West with the cohesion of bloc forces involved and to prevent Western miscalculation about Soviet intentions.

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